Introduction
Despite recent reports to the contrary, corporate diversification remains a ubiquitous feature of the modern economic landscape (Montgomery 1994 ). In the last decade, the resource-based view of the firm has been touted as particularly well suited to understanding diversification. Nevertheless, the operationalization of this framework has been limited to broad characterization of resources and the industries in which they might be fruitfully applied. For example, empirical studies have focused on proxies such as R&D spending to measure technological resources, finding that firms that exhibit high R&D intensities tend to diversify into industries that also exhibit high R&D intensities. While informative, this is substantially different from theoretical expositions of the resource-based view (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984 , Barney 1986 ) and related research into "technological competence" (e.g., Patel and Pavitt 1994) , which suggest that a particular technological resource is useful in only a narrow range of applications. Put another way, the empirical research on the resource-based view can not predict whether a pharmaceutical firm is more likely to enter biotechnology or electronic data processing, both of which exhibit similar R&D intensities.
In addition, the resource-based approach to diversification has generally under emphasized the possibility that firms can exploit resources through market arrangements rather than through expansion of corporate boundaries (exceptions include Teece 1980 Teece , 1982 . Transaction cost economics suggests that managers (and scholars) should consider alternate contractual methods by which a firm can exploit its resources. While many resource-based scholars have acknowl-edged theoretically that resources might be exploited through contracts, the empirical approaches to the question of diversification have implicitly or explicitly assumed that any resource valuable, rare, and inimitable enough to generate sustainable rents is too asset specific (in the sense of Williamson 1985) to be contracted out.
This study extends previous research in two ways. Empirically, it operationalizes technological resources at a more fine-grained level than has been done in prior resource-based research. This facilitates the integration of elements of the technological competence and resource-based literatures to shed additional light on firms' diversifying behavior, and supports more stringent testing of diversification directionality than in previous research. Theoretically, by stressing the links between transaction cost economics and the resource-based view, it examines and tests the assumption that rent-generating resources are necessarily too asset specific to allow contracting.
The Resource-Based View of Diversification
During the last fifteen years, scholars have developed a resource-based framework for analyzing business strategy. Drawing heavily on Penrose (1959) , the resource-based framework suggests that the firm is best viewed as a collection of sticky and imperfectly imitable resources or capabilities that enable it to successfully compete against other firms (Wernerfelt 1984 , Barney 1986 ). These resources can be physical, such as unique equipment or innovations protected by patents, or intangible, such as brand equity or operating routines. Of particular importance is the applicationspecificity inherent in such resources. The same characteristics that enable a firm to extract a sustainable rent stream from these assets often make it nearly impossible for the firm to "transplant" them or utilize them effectively in a new context. Thus, a firm that has developed an advantageous resource position is protected to the extent that its resources are specific to certain applications; at the same time, this specificity constrains the firm's ability to transfer these resources to new applications (Montgomery and Wemerfelt 1988) .
Operationalization of Resources
Empirical research on diversification has typically followed one of two paths to operationalize resources. The first avenue rests on the assumption that more "related" diversification supports more extensive exploitation of application-specific resources than does unrelated diversification. Most studies in this vein have relied on proximity within the SIC system to measure the degree of relatedness between two industries (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) . The second avenue relies on R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and other such investments as proxies for underlying resources. Montgomery and Hariharan (1991) find that firms tend to diversify into industries that have R&D intensities, advertising intensities, and capital expenditure intensities similar to those of the firms' existing businesses. They also find that higher R&D intensities and advertising intensities are associated with more diversification, and interpret this as evidence that R&D and marketing activity creates transferable resources that provide competitive advantage.' Each of these constructs is subject to criticism. Any measure of industry relatedness that relies on proximity among SIC codes necessarily rests on strong assumptions about the ordering of the SIC system. SIC-based constructs typically rely on categorical decision rules (such as "1 if in same 2-digit industry, 0 otherwise") that assume that each SIC code is equidistant from all other codes-in other words, as Gollop and Monahan (1991) note, the chemical industry (SIC 28) is equally "distant" from petroleum (SIC 29) and nonelectrical machinery (SIC 35). Such measures also assume that 3-or 4-digit industries within a single 2-digit SIC are equally "similar" to each other. The use of such measures for a resource-based test are of particular concern, because the SIC system is based on product (output) characteristics rather than on resource (input) characteristics. It is therefore unclear whether proximate 3-or 4-digit SIC codes actually share common or similar resource use patterns.
A corollary concern exists regarding the fungibility (Patel and Pavitt 1994) .2 Yet the proxies used in the resource-based empirical research do not capture these constraints. Three recent studies have focused explicitly on underlying resource requirements across industries to examine diversification patterns. Farjoun (1994) uses census data to operationalize industry relatedness as the degree to which two industries use the same types and proportions of human expertise. He finds that a firm tends to diversify into industries that rely on patterns of expertise similar to those required in its extant industries. Coff and Hatfield (1995) use similar data in a study of acquisition announcements, finding evidence of higher returns for acquisitions that are more "related" in terms of human expertise. Robins and Wiersema (1995) use Scherer's technology inflowoutflow matrix to operationalize industry relatedness as the degree to which two industries rely on the same inflows of technology, finding that corporate performance is higher for firms that have diversified into technologically related industries than those that have diversified into technologically unrelated industries.
However, these three studies characterize resources only at the industry level; they do not have informa-suggests that firms are able to alter the direction of their technological strengths only gradually. Jaffe also finds that firms benefit from "nearby" R&D far more than from "distant" R&D, suggesting severe limits on the fungibility of technological knowledge-an implication that is consistent with Scott and Pascoe's (1987) study of "purposive diversification" in R&D.
tion on firms' repositories of expertise or technology. Focusing on industry aggregate data precludes the analysis of interfirm differences in resource pools and diversification patterns. This in turn limits these studies' ability to address issues relating to heterogeneity in firms' resource bases. As shown below, identification of individual firms' resource portfolios allows development of more nuanced insights into the role of resources in diversification, and more fully-developed integration of resource-based insights with those of other approaches.
Below I construct a measure of corporate technological resources, based on patent data, that arguably captures more effectively than R&D intensity the narrow range of businesses in which a firm's technological resources can be profitably applied. Following the logic of the resource-based theorists, I expect that a firm will more readily diversify into industries in which its portfolio of technological resources will confer competitive advantage. HYPOTHESIS 1. Ceteris paribus, afirm is more likely to diversify into a business the more applicable its existing technological resources are to that business (in absolute terms).
This hypothesis differs from those tested in the above-cited empirical tests of diversification, which have hypothesized that a firm will be more likely to diversify into a business the more similar its R&D intensity is to the R&D intensity of the business. In effect, I expect that addition of more accurate measures of technical resources and the businesses in which they provide value will significantly improve the explanation of corporate diversification patterns.
A firm is constrained in the amount of entry it can pursue in a given time period due to limitations on managerial time (Penrose 1959 
Independent Variables-Measures of Technological Resource Applicability
AbsTechi is defined as the absolute level of firm i's patent portfolio that is likely to be applicable to industry j. It is derived from firm i's patent portfolio as follows. First, I used the U.S. Patent Class-U.S. SIC concordance developed in Silverman (1996) to derive probability-weighted assignments to four-digit SICs for each patent in firm i's portfolio. This concordance takes advantage of the fact that the Canadian Patent Office (CPO) assigns each granted patent to both a patent class and to SICs in which the patented innovation is likely to be manufactured and used. It uses the frequency with which Canadian patents in each patent class are assigned to each SIC to create a probability distribution relating U.S. patent classes to U.S. SIC codes. For example, suppose that the CPO has granted 376 patents assigned to patent class i, and has assigned 138 of these patents to SIC j as the SIC of Use. source-based theorists have hypothesized variations on Hypothesis 2, the hypothesis has previously remained untested due to the difficulty of constructing sufficiently detailed empirical constructs.
Independent Variables-Measures of Contractual Hazards
Proxies for transaction cost-related hazards associated with contracting out innovations are derived from the Yale survey on research and development. In their survey of senior R&D executives at several hundred large U.S. firms in the early 1980s, Levin et al. (1987) asked each respondent to rate on a seven-point scale, for his/her line of business, the importance of several mechanisms for appropriating returns to innovation including licensing royalties, secrecy, and learningcurve advantages. Several scholars have used these to proxy for the overall strength of a given industry's appropriability regime, usually by taking the highest rating from across all mechanisms. In this study I use them individually to proxy for contracting hazards associated with exploiting innovation in a given industry.
Royaltyj is defined as the feasibility of licensing innovations in industry j. I assume that the more important license royalties are as a method of appropriating returns to innovation in industry j, the lower the hazards and, hence, transaction costs associated with contracting for technology in industry j (Levin et al. 1987 ). Hypothesis 3a proposes that, in such industries, firms will prefer to exploit their technical resources through contractual means rather than through expansion of their boundaries. Conversely, in industries where license royalties are not effective for appropriating returns, firms will have little alternative but to diversify if they are to exploit their technical resources. Thus, the coefficient for Royaltyj is expected to be negative. Secrecyj is defined as the importance of secrecy to appropriating returns to innovation in industry j. I assume that in industries where secrecy is important, contracting for technology is subject to hazards associated with concern about information leakage. Hypothesis 3b proposes that, in such industries, firms will rely on diversification rather than contracting to exploit their technological resources. The Absolute value of the difference between industry IlAdvlnt1 -FAdvlntjl advertising intensity and firm advertising intensity * All models were also specified using ln(FSales), with no change in results. coefficient for Secrecy1 is therefore expected to be positive.
Learningj is defined as the importance of learning curve advantages to appropriating returns to innovation in industry j. I assume that in industries where learning curve advantages are efficacious, knowledge is sufficiently tacit that it does not leak out of the learning firm. Grindley and Teece (1997) have noted the hazards associated with contracting for technology when licensees will subsequently generate tacit knowledge concerning the licensed technology-for example, by making more difficult the monitoring and enforcement of "grant-back" provisions in which the licensee must transfer to the licensor all improvements to the licensed technology.9 Hypothesis 3c proposes that, in such industries, firms will rely on diversification rather than contracting to exploit their technological resources. The coefficient for Learningj is therefore expected to be positive. ' In addition, much of the transaction cost literature on licensing discusses the hazards associated with a licensor's tacit knowledge. The current study does not directly address such hazards due to the difficulty of parameterizing tacit knowledge in a firm's existing businesses, as opposed to the industry of potential entry.
Control Variables
A number of control variables are included in the model. In addition to controlling for various firm, industry, and firm-industry relatedness characteristics that both theory and prior empirical research suggest will affect diversification behavior, inclusion of these variables facilitates the comparison of this study's results to those of prior resource-based research on diversification. Firm-level variables include firm size, growth, R&D intensity, and advertising intensity. Industry-level variables include industry size, growth, R&D intensity, and advertising intensity. Firm-industry relatedness measures include the difference between firm i's R&D intensity and industry j's R&D intensity, and the difference between firm i's advertising intensity and industry j's advertising intensity. Table 1 identifies the data source, measurement, and expected sign of each of these variables. As Table 1 
Logit Estimation: Results and Discussion
The phenomenon under study is best described by a categorical variable-either entry takes place or it does not. Rather than use all 169,698 nonentries in my analysis, I used state-based sampling techniques to construct a sample of entries and nonentries. I derived a sample consisting of all entries and slightly less than one percent of nonentries (the latter were selected using SAS's random number generator). Manski and McFadden (1981) have demonstrated that state-based sampling provides more efficient generation of information than does a purely random sample when a population is overwhelmingly characterized by one state, and that logit estimation using data derived 
Effect of Technological Resource Applicability Measures
The first set of logit estimations is presented in Table  4 , Models 1-3 (elasticities appear in Table 5 ). The results for the regression using only traditional measures of entry barriers and firms' resources (model 1) are generally consistent with those of previous studies. All variables are signed as expected. All variables except IGrowth1 are significant at p < 0.05. The only surprise of this regression is the lack of significance for industry growth, which is commonly considered to be one of the primary influences on entry. Nevertheless, there is empirical precedent for this result (Montgomery and Hariharan 1991, Lemelin 1982). Model 2 introduces AbsTechij, the absolute level of firm i's technological resource base that is applicable to industry j. AbsTechi is significant and positive, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. Further, the likelihood ratio test indicates that inclusion of AbsTechi significantly improves the fit of the model (X2(1) = 134.24; p < 0.01). At the same time, the coefficients for the identical to those reported in the paper, and are available on request. Table 4 Logit Estimation of Entry (** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, + = p < 0.10)
Test of Technical Resource Measures Test of Appropriability Effects
(N = 2514) (N = 1380)
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Effect of Contractual Hazard Measures
The second set of logit estimations are presented in Table 4 , Models 4-6. As described above, measures of appropriability-the importance of licensing royalties, secrecy, and exploiting the learning curve-are derived from the Yale survey on R&D. This survey covers approximately half of the manufacturing SICs. Empirical tests involving these measures were consequently restricted to the 621 entries and 759 nonentries in the sample for which data was available. Models 4 and 5 recreate for this reduced sample the conventional resource-based model and the model incorporating AbsTechi and RelTechi. Comparison with Models 1 and 3 indicates that results for the reduced sample are substantially similar to those for the complete sample. The primary difference is the insignificance of FR&DInti in the reduced sample results, due to the higher standard error associated with the decreased number of observations. Model 6 introduces the three contractual hazard measures, Royaltyj, Secrecyj, and Learningj. As predicted by Hypothesis 3a, Royalty1's coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that a firm is less likely to diversify into an industry when viable contractual alternatives exist to exploit its technological resources. The coefficient for Learningj is positive and significant, as predicted by Hypothesis 3c, which suggests that a firm is more likely to exploit its technological resources through diversification when those resources are characterized by cumulative, tacit knowledge, which makes their market transfer difficult and hazardous. The coefficient for Secrecyj is positive but not significant. The hypothesis that a firm is more likely to exploit its technological resources through diversification when those resources are subject to contracting hazards due to expropriation risks associated with information revelation (H3b) is thus not supported. Inclusion of all three variables significantly improves the fit of the model (x2(3) = 8.88; p < 0.05).
Effect on Estimated Probability of Diversification Logit estimation does not yield coefficients whose effects on the dependent variable can be directly interpreted. Since logit estimation is not a linear form, the effect of a change in an independent variable depends on the initial level of that variable and on the value of the other variables in the model. Formally, the change in probability of diversification associated with a change in an independent variable from x to x' is calculated by: where X and X' are vectors of all independent variables in the model and X' differs from X only in that the variable of concern equals x' rather than x.
The left half of Table 5 shows the effect on the estimated probability of diversifying entry for an increase in each independent variable from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean, conditional on all other variables being at their mean values. By way of illustration, consider a firm whose characteristics all happen to be equal to the sample's mean values (e.g., FSalesi = 3.737). Suppose this firm may potentially enter two industries, jl and j2, whose industry characteristics also happen to be equal to the sample's mean values (e.g., IGrowthj = 10.011). Suppose that AbsTechij, happens to be equal to the mean value for AbsTechij (3.020), but that AbsTechi,2 is equal to one standard deviation above this (22.279). Then the probability that firm i diversifies into industry jl is 0.466, while the probability that firm i diversifies into industry j2 is 0.917.13 As was discussed earlier, the technological resource measures are highly skewed. Since the changes in probability described above use the mean and standard deviation of each independent variable, such skewness is likely to exaggerate the effect of these variables on probability of entry. The right half of Table 5 presents the change in probability of diversification associated with changing each independent variable from its median value to its third quartile value. The technological resource variables have smaller effects when these values are used. This marked difference in effect on probability of entry between mean-standard deviation and medianthird quartile measures exists because the vast majority of firm-industry pairs have extremely low levels of AbsTechi,. Such a difference is consistent with the resource-based view, which is predicated on the notion that rent-generating resources, while few and far between, are significant to firm decision-making when they exist.
state-based sampling. For the population, the probability of entry when all variables are set to their means is less than 0.01, rising to slightly more than 0.09 when AbsTechi is increased by one standard deviation.
Further Exploration of Diversification Direction: Industry of Manufacture vs. Industry of Use A patent can be assigned to both the industry in which it is used (SIC of Use) and, if it is a product patent, to the industry in which it is manufactured (SIC of Manufacture). AbsTechi and RelTechi are calculated based on equal weightings of both assignments. This implicitly assumes that a firm is as likely to exploit its technological resources by entering an industry in which it can manufacture its patented technology as it is by entering an industry in which it can use its technology. I tested this assumption by constructing alternate measures of AbsTech and RelTech, based solely on SIC of Use or on SIC of Manufacture (AbsTechU/RelTechU and AbsTechM/ RelTechM, respectively). These tests, available from the author, indicate that the assumption is correct: For the entire sample, no alternate specification of technological resource applicability significantly improves on the measure used above.
Nevertheless, it is possible that for certain subsets of industries or technologies one of these technology exploitation routes dominates corporate diversification behavior-that firms tend to enter the business in which their technology can be used rather than where The Yale survey asked respondents to rate the importance of several sources of innovation in their respective industries, including material suppliers, equipment suppliers, and users. I categorized those industries for which the importance of material suppliers or equipment suppliers as sources of innovation was rated above the mean as supplier-dominated industries.14 Those industries for which the importance of users as sources of innovation was rated above the mean were categorized as userdominated industries. Industries with below-average ratings for the importance of suppliers and users were categorized as non-dominated. For each of these industry categories, I reestimated model 3 using three different measures of technological resource applicability: 1) AbsTech and RelTech; 2) AbsTechU and RelTechU; and 3) AbsTechM and RelTechM.
Rather than present the entire estimation results, which remain substantially the same across all runs, Table 6 identifies which specification of technological resource applicability offers the best fit for each industry category, as measured by the chi-square statistic. As the Table shows, These results provide at least crude empirical support for the contention by Pavitt and his colleagues that the direction of technology-based entry varies across indus-14 Alternate cutoffs such as the third quartile generated similar results, although significance was reduced due to the lower number of observations. tries as the primary source of innovation varies. They also provide a cautionary counterbalance to studies emphasizing the benefits of relying on users or suppliers as sources for new innovations. Von Hippel (1988) has detailed a number of industries in which users develop and prototype new innovations that manufacturers then commercialize. Teece (1992) has suggested that such symbiotic relationships with users or suppliers can underpin vertical collaborative ventures. The above results suggest, however, that managers should not be too sanguine about the potential competitive implications of user or supplier technological capabilities.
Conclusion
This study is the first attempt of which I am aware to examine the effects of firms' heterogeneous technological resources as measured by patent data on diversification behavior. It is also the first study to examine empirically the frequently voiced, but previously untested, hypothesis that firms prioritize their diversification options according to the relative applicability of their resources across these options. Finally, it is the first study to explicitly examine empirically the role of transaction costs on diversification in the context of the resourcebased view of the firm. The results suggest that a firm's technological resource base, as manifested in its corporate patent portfolio, significantly influences its diversification decisions. In particular, a firm elects to enter markets in which it can exploit its existing technological resources and in which its existing resource base is strongest. In addition, a firm's diversification decision is influenced by the severity of hazards surrounding contractual alternatives to diversification. Finally, the results suggest that, as Pavitt and colleagues have conjectured, the source of innovation in an industry indicates the direction of likely diversifying entry into that industry.
In addition to using the resource-based view to shed light onto diversification, this study has used the phenomenon of diversification to shed light on the resourcebased view. First, resource-based empirical research has lagged its theoretical counterpart in the operationalization of sufficiently detailed, application-specific measures of firms' resources. This has restricted the scope of the framework's empirical research agenda, and perhaps has biased downward the apparent empirical significance of resources to firm behavior and performance. The powerful effect of technological resources on diversification identified in this study suggests that similar operationalization of other resources may further reveal the power of the resource-based view.
Second, the resource-based view remains at odds with transaction cost economics over perceived differences in the feasibility of using markets to exploit rent-generating assets (Montgomery and Hariharan 1991) and, more recently, over the role of opportunism and motivation of hazard mitigation as determinants of organization form (Chi 1994 , Argyres 1996 , Conner and Prahalad 1996 . This study's integration of transaction cost reasoning into the resource-based view suggests that while conflicts between the two theories do exist, the strong complementarities between them should not be ignored.
Finally, this study has developed and used a new measure of a firm's technological resource base. Although similar in spirit to prior patent-based measures of "technological position" (e.g., Jaffe 1986), the measure developed herein is able to link a firm's position to product markets where its technological strength is likely to offer commercial advantage. Future research could entail elaboration of this measure to inform a wide range of research questions, including stock market valuation of patented technology (e.g., Cockburn and Griliches 1988) and broader issues of corporate governance and scope (e.g., Lang and Stulz 1992).15
